• Under certain conditions, current federal regulations allow the use of the phrase "brand-name or equal" for procurement specifications. The same regulations, however, state that performance specifications are preferred to encourage vendors to offer innovative solutions. 3 Unfortunately, many federal agencies routinely use the "brand-name or equal" clause to describe microprocessors in procurements of computing products. This non-competitive practice is inherently biased against non-name-brand product offerings and encourages purchasing decisions based on brand-name recognition and perception instead of objective performance measures.
Many Government Purchases Lack Process Transparency and Accountability
• Many government purchases are made through ordering processes under Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity contracts (ID/IQ), Government Wide Acquisitions (GWAC) vehicles, and the General Services Administration's Federal Supply Schedules (FSS) that are not routinely posted on FedBizOps, making it difficult to track these transactions and raising questions about the transparency and public accountability of purchases made through these mechanisms.
Recommendation: The U.S. Government Needs Stronger Enforcement and Regulations to Ensure Competition
• Brand-name specifications in government contracts for computer hardware inhibits competition in the market for microprocessors, leading to higher prices and less variety, thereby hurting government agencies and American taxpayers. To ensure price and performance competition, the government should improve enforcement of existing restrictions for brand-name specifications and enact stronger regulations requiring the use of objective, third-party benchmarking criteria for specifications involving highly technical products such as microprocessors.
I. COMPETITION REDUCES PRICES AND INCREASES WELFARE
Market competition is the mechanism used in our society to allocate scarce resources among many competing needs. Economists agree that enhancing competition in a market improves economic welfare. 4 Competition puts pressure on firms to create and offer better value to customers. As a result, consumers benefit because they have access to a greater supply of higher-quality products, available at lower prices.
As a general rule, then, free competition based "on the merits" should determine which firms ultimately produce the goods and services demanded by consumers. However, departures from this principle may be justified in certain cases. For example, when a very large firm dominates a market, a handicapping system that would encourage competition by smaller firms could be justified.
II. EXCLUSIONARY LANGUAGE USED IN PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS RESTRAINS COMPETITION, LEADING TO HIGHER PRICES AND HARM TO U.S. TAXPAYERS
Procurement specifications necessarily restrict competition. By providing a detailed description of the item to be acquired, a procurement specification effectively narrows down the set of available choices.
However, not all specifications are exclusionary, in the sense of artificially or unnecessarily restricting competition. Some specifications are necessary to ensure that the relevant set of alternatives comply with certain quality requirements or adequately serve the performance and functional needs of the buyer.
Exclusionary specifications by definition do not serve any useful purpose; they unnecessarily reduce the set of alternative suppliers, and they constitute artificial restrictions to competition. Anticompetitive procurement language increases prices and reduces quantities, product variety, and quality.
Competition in federal procurements is limited by the use of anticompetitive specifications like "brand name or equal," leading to higher prices for federal agencies and American taxpayers. For these reasons, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) states that "agency requirements shall not be written so as to require a particular brand name, product, or feature of a product, peculiar to one manufacturer, thereby precluding consideration of a product manufactured by another company. . . ." 5 However, despite this express language, some federal agencies continue to use brand name specifications in their procurements.
When exclusionary specifications are imposed unnecessarily, incentive problems for both prospective buyers and sellers arise. On the demand side, government procurement officers have little incentive to select the non-brand name product, when the procurement language specifies use of a brand name product or its "equivalent." In such a circumstance, the safe, low-risk choice for a government procurement officer is to select the brand name product, a decision best illustrated by the old advertisement: "Nobody ever got fired for
The "brand name or equal" requirement forces suppliers of "equivalent" products to demonstrate their products are equivalent to the brand name product, while vendors of the brand name product are free of that burden. Those vendors capable of supplying both the brand name product and its non-brand name equivalent find it easier to offer the former, avoiding the cost of showing that the alternatives are actually equivalent to the brand name item. Thus, the specification of "brand name or equal" biases the competition in favor of the brand name in two ways: first by encouraging procurement officers to select the brand name rather than verify that the alternative product is indeed equivalent, and second by encouraging suppliers to favor the brand name product.
In response to this continued practice, The federal government's concern with its procurement practices also was emphasized in a Government Accountability Office study last year. 8 This study found that the federal agencies purchasing products through the General Services Administration's multiple award schedules program did not follow certain operating procedures required to ensure the government receives the lowest prices available under its schedule programs.
In addition to adverse effects on prices paid by federal agencies, the use of brand name specifications can reduce the variety of products available for purchase. 
Specifications Should be Based on Performance Measures such as Objective Benchmarks from Standard ThirdParty Benchmarking Organizations
No efficiency reason exists to justify the use of exclusionary language in public procurements. 9 In some circumstances, the variety and complexity of items along with a lack of consistent benchmarks could compel contracting agents to use brand names rather than to detail specific technical requirements and product characteristics. In the case of microprocessors, however, third-party benchmarks represent a solution to such procurement specification problems. The use of microprocessor benchmark scores in computer contract solicitations appropriately emphasizes the necessary physical, functional, and performance characteristics of these items while remaining brand neutral and objective. In contrast, procurement language based solely on microprocessor brand name, or specific features such as clock speed, may be misleading, since they do not accurately reflect the desired performance target. In fact, the performance of a microprocessor with a fast clock-speed may be adversely affected by other components in the motherboard, such as RAM memory, for example, and by the set of software applications with which it is expected to interact. Such considerations will be overlooked by procurement specifications based on brand names or clock-speeds; rather, requirements should be based on more comprehensive measures of performance appropriate to the tasks for which the computer is intended to be used.
Fortunately, and as alluded to in the OMB memorandum, there are independent testing organizations that produce application-based benchmarks. An example is PC WorldBench, a firm that provides rigorous performance testing and benchmarking services. Similarly, BAPco is a non-profit consortium whose "charter is to develop and distribute a set of objective performance benchmarks based on popular computer applications and industry standard operating systems." 10 Both AMD and Intel are members of BAPco, along with a host of other computer hardware and software manufacturers.
PC WorldBench, BAPco SYSmark, and other independent parties have established rigorous testing procedures for benchmarking the performance level of computer microprocessors. The standards being set by qualified benchmarking firms and industry-standard consortiums have gained wide acceptance within the consumer electronics and semiconductor industries. The independent nature of the benchmarking firms alleviates concern over preferential treatment of particular manufacturers and opens government agencies to the benefits of competition in product price and quality.
Further, benchmarks standardize the often complex and diverse language surrounding technology products. Specifying in contracts the required performance level of a unit, rather than naming a particular brand, enables government agencies to communicate in simple terms the exact quality standards of a needed item. The use of a benchmark score also simplifies for contracting agencies the task of comparing product performance. In particular, one benchmarking strategy is to measure the performance of computer systems as they respond to the demands of actual software applications. Such application-based evaluations are highly applicable to the performance concerns of government agencies, which are often related to a processor's ability to perform tasks on specific applications. For example, PC WorldBench "uses real applications running realworld tasks to assess a PC's overall processing speed." 11 In terms of simplicity, articulating a set of relevant benchmark values is superior to the requirements associated with naming a specific microprocessor brand name or product. The FAR requires that "[b]rand name or equal purchase descriptions must include, in addition to the brand name, a general description of those salient physical, functional, or performance characteristics of the brand name item that an 'equal' item must meet to be acceptable for award." 12 Moreover, last year, the OMB stepped up the requirements associated with requesting specific brand names, asking agencies to publicly post justification for the use of a brand name in a contract solicitation. Benchmark specifications eliminate the need for these efforts, as the product characteristics are quantified by the benchmark score.
11 http://www.pcworld.com/reviews/article/0,aid,32801,00.asp 12 Federal Acquisition Regulation, issued jointly by the U.S. General Services Administration, the U.S. Department of Defense, and the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, March 2005, at 11.104.
Performance Based Specifications Promote Competition, Innovation, and Cost Savings
In summary, when government contracts request brand names, this inhibits competition in the market for processors, leading to higher prices for computer equipment and less variety, thereby hurting government agencies and American taxpayers. As there is no efficiency or pro-competitive case in favor of using such exclusionary language, these restrictions are unnecessary and should be eliminated. A likely outcome of such modification will be a reduction in prices, significant cost savings for government agencies and the US Treasury, an increased product variety and a more efficient allocation of resources. disadvantageous position vis-à-vis Intel. As discussed above, procurement officials have little incentive to select the non-Intel microprocessor: that is, their low-risk choice is to select the brand name product. Also, vendors have an incentive to offer the Intel processor, rather than incurring the cost of showing that a non-Intel product is "equivalent" to the Intel processor mentioned in the specifications. Thus, to the extent that the Intel brand name is explicitly mentioned in the requirements while no mention of alternative suppliers is made, it unfairly discriminates against Intel rivals. Examples of government contract solicitations of this sort included the following:
III. EVIDENCE OF EXCLUSIONARY LANGUAGE
In a "Sources Sought" notice (posted It is important to note that this study reviewed only those federal government procurement solicitations that were posted on the federal online procurement notice website, FedBizOpps.gov. A substantial number of federal purchases are not listed on FedBizOpps.gov and therefore are not readily available to the public, raising questions about the public accountability for those purchases. For example, government purchases that are less than $25,000 that are not required to be posted on FedBizOpps.gov and can be directly made through existing ID/IQ, GWAC or GSA Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) contracts. These types of purchases are not required to be posted publicly and information about the product specifications and purchasing criteria an agency may use in such a purchase is not readily available to the public, although it may be available upon request or through a Freedom of Information Act request. Furthermore, these purchasing mechanisms do not appear to have accountability or enforcement mechanisms in place to ensure compliance with the FAR prohibition on the use of brand-name specifications. In fact, the GSA FSS may actually encourage agency officials to make purchasing decisions based on brand names since products admitted to the FSS are listed by brand name and not by product performance.
This situation is of particular concern because, according to an article last year in VARBusiness, "The General Services Administration (GSA) reported that spending on GSA Schedule contracts for IT products and services exceeded $15 billion in fiscal year 2003. Based on that figure, the GSA Schedule contracts account for a full one-third of external IT spending by the federal government. " 23 Clearly, the GSA FSS is an important purchasing tool for government agencies and can assist agencies in reducing administrative costs associated with purchasing by effectively screening products and vendors who are capable of supplying the federal government with products that meet minimum standards. However, the lack of readily available public information regarding these purchases, particularly the criteria used by agency personnel to select a particular good or service, is cause for concern and should be reviewed by federal procurement authorities.
IV. ELIMINATING EXCLUSIONARY LANGUAGE WOULD SAVE U.S. TAXPAYERS HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
In this section, I estimate the cost savings that government agencies and U.S. taxpayers likely would realize if the anticompetitive, exclusionary brand name specifications were eliminated. The computation is carried out in the following steps:
Step Tables 1 and 2 below. Table 1 gives the likely savings discounted at the present prime interest rate of 6%, and Table 2 gives the likely savings discounted at the federal funds rate of 3%.
Step 2: Estimate the percentage of all contracts that contain brand name specifications. Tables 1 and 2 ).
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Step 3 and AMD's market shares in the worldwide market for servers (6.5%) to the total number of units procured with exclusionary language. 26 Finally, the present value of these savings is computed by discounting the annual savings at the current prime interest rate (see Table 1 ), and the federal funds rate (see Table 2 ). The annual savings are assumed to continue in perpetuity. This assumption is appropriate since if an agency stops using brand name specifications in favor of vendor-neutral specifications (as required by the recent OMB directive cited above), the agency would be expected to maintain that policy.
In sum, my analysis shows that the federal government and U.S. taxpayers likely would save approximately $281 million to $563 million in present value savings by adopting vendor-neutral contract specifications. Given the minimal costs of such a policy, my recommendation is that, absent some 24 http://www.eps.gov. 25 As an alternative, one could estimate the percentage of desktop computers, mobile computers, and servers purchased in procurements having exclusionary, brand name specifications. extraordinary reason for specifying a particular brand name product, federal procurements should be vendor neutral and use standard third-party benchmarking criteria to specify the type of hardware sought for purchase.
EXAMPLE: Improved Competition for Microprocessors can save the U.S. Air Force Tens of Millions of Dollars
Several large U.S. government bodies utilize the exclusionary language outlined elsewhere in this report.
For example, until last year the United States Air Force's (USAF) commodity purchasing program solely purchased Intel products, and specified this requirement in all of their procurement materials. Not only was this anti-competitive practice not in compliance with the FAR, but as one of the federal government's largest consumers of computing products the agency was potentially wasting millions of dollars due to the lack of competition. An additional concern was the USAF's use of Blanket Purchase Agreements ("BPAs"), under which the agency contracts with one business to supply not only its current requirements, but also its future requirements for the specified product for up to five years. In a recent request for proposals from small business OEMs, the USAF estimated that "the total volume of purchases through the small business BPA(s) will have an aggregate value of $100M over 5 years." 27 In issuing such a purchase agreement, the agency would not only discriminate in their current procurements, but in future procurements as well.
Last year the USAF made a substantial effort to improve competition between competing microprocessor products. As a result, the agency is likely to reap substantial cost savings along with the potential for improved product performance and future innovation. In fact, based on the assumptions of this study, full competition for competing microprocessor products could save the USAF and taxpayers approximately $2.2 million per year, with a present value of between $36.7 and $73.4 million, assuming that the USAF's planned hardware refreshes take place as scheduled (see Table 3 ). While this amount is relatively small in comparison to the USAF information technology budget, it is not insignificant. 
